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An ongoing debate sets capital budgeting against market timing. The primary difficulty in evaluating
these theories is finding distinct exogenous proxies for investment opportunities and mispricing. We
use demand shifts induced by demographics to address this problem, and hence, provide a more definitive
analysis of the theories. According to capital budgeting, industries anticipating positive demand shifts
in the near future should issue more equity (and debt) to finance additional capacity. To the extent
that demographic shifts in the more distant future are not incorporated into equity prices, market timing
implies that industries anticipating positive demand shifts in the distant future should issue less equity
due to undervaluation. We find evidence supporting both capital budgeting and market timing: new
listings and equity issuance by existing listings respond positively to demand shifts up to 5 years ahead,
and negatively to demand shifts 5 to 10 years ahead.
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The determinants of equity issuance are the subject of an ongoing debate in corporate
ﬁnance. Are initial and seasoned oﬀerings best explained by the demands for external ﬁnance,
or are they driven by market timing in response to company misvaluation?
Capital budgeting holds that ﬁrms issue equity (and debt) to invest the proceeds in positive
net-present-value projects, for example to expand production when demand is high (Modigliani
and Miller, 1958). Market timing instead holds that ﬁrms issue equity to take advantage of
mispricing by investors. (Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, forthcoming; Stein, 1996).
One crucial diﬃculty in evaluating these theories is the lack of exogenous proxies for invest-
ment opportunities, on the one hand, and for misvaluation, on the other hand. For instance,
the relationship between the market-to-book ratio and corporate decisions could reﬂect invest-
ment opportunities (Campello and Graham, 2006), mispricing related to accruals or dispersion
of opinion (Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman, 2005; Polk and Sapienza, forthcoming),
or both (Hertzel and Yi, 2007). These issues are also linked to whether market-to-book is
a proxy for risk (Fama and French, 1992) or a measure of mispricing relative to accounting
fundamentals (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1994).
We use demographic variables as proxies for both in a novel evaluation of these two theories.
We consider industries that are aﬀected by predictable shifts in cohort sizes, such as breweries
and long-term care facilities. These industries have distinctive age proﬁles of consumption.
Therefore, forecastable changes in the age distribution produce forecastable shifts in demand
for various goods. Even though these demand shifts only capture a small component of the
variation in investment opportunities and mispricing, they are exogenous from the perspective
of the manager. As such, they allow us to address the endogeneity problem and identify
separately the managerial response to variationi ni n v e s t m e n to p p o r t u n i t i e sa n dm i s p r i c i n g .
We distinguish between shifts that will aﬀect an industry in the near future, up to 5 years
ahead, and shifts that will occur in the more distant future, 5 to 10 years ahead. As the model
in Section 2 demonstrates, traditional capital budgeting indicates that industries aﬀected by
positive demand shifts in the near future should raise capital to increase production. Positive
demand shifts increase marginal productivity and the optimal level of investment; in turn, the
1desire for more investment induces demand for additional capital. Therefore, demand shifts
due to demographics in the near future should be positively related to equity issuance.
Another prediction relies on the assumption that investors are short-sighted and hence
partially neglect forecastable demographic shifts further in the future (5 to 10 years ahead).
Indeed, demand shifts due to demographics 5-10 years ahead signiﬁcantly predict industry-level
abnormal returns (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007). In our model, we assume that managers in a
particular industry have longer foresight horizons than investors–perhaps because managers
usually develop in-depth knowledge essential to long-term planning. Under this assumption,
demand shifts in the distant future serve as proxies for mispricing and managers react to
this mispricing by modifying their equity issuance decisions. Companies in industries with
positive demand shifts 5 to 10 years ahead will tend to be undervalued and managers respond
by reducing equity issuance (or repurchasing equity). Conversely, companies in industries
with negative demand shifts 5 to 10 years ahead will tend to be overvalued, and managers
react by issuing additional equity. This analysis assumes that the announcement of issuing or
repurchasing equity does not cause investors to fully eliminate the mispricing.
We also consider a special case in which time-to-build considerations create a trade-oﬀ
between raising equity to ﬁnance investment and repurchasing equity to exploit mispricing.
In this setting ﬁr m sf a c i n gh i g hd e m a n dg r o w t hi nt h ed i s t a n tf u t u r eh a v ef a v o r a b l el o n g -
term investment opportunities but cannot delay investment until the associated undervaluation
eventually disappears. Hence, the model indicates that the predictions outlined in the two
previous paragraphs should be attenuated in high time-to-build industries compared to low
time-to-build industries.
Although the model in Section 2 does not include debt, we analyze a prediction regarding
debt. Capital budgeting suggests that companies aﬀected by positive demand shifts in the
near-term should raise capital. These companies can raise capital by borrowing through loans
or by issuing bonds (debt issuance) in addition to issuing equity. Market timing does not have
a clear prediction about the relationship between long-term demand shifts and debt issuance.1
1In this context the extent to which debt is mispriced when equity is mispriced is unclear. In addition,
it is possible that debt issuance is a substitute for equity issuance if equity is mispriced. For instance,
a ﬁrm with undervalued equity might issue debt to repurchase equity or to ﬁnance greater investment.
2To summarize, capital budgeting predicts that demand shifts due to demographics in the
near future should be positively related to debt and equity issuance, while market timing
suggests that demand shifts further in the future should be negatively related to equity issuance.
We note that these two predictions are not mutually exclusive. We test these predictions using
various measures of debt and equity. In Section 3 we describe the construction of demand
shifts due to demographics by combining forecasts of future cohort sizes and estimates of age
proﬁles of consumption and we introduce the measures of external corporate ﬁnancing.
In Section 4 we analyze the impact of demographics on the likelihood of initial public oﬀer-
ings (IPOs) and additional equity issuance by listed ﬁrms in an industry. We ﬁnd that demand
shifts due to demographics up to 5 years ahead are positively related to the ratio of new listings
to existing listings, consistent with capital budgeting. Demand shifts due to demographics 5
to 10 years are signiﬁcantly negatively related with this IPO measure, consistent with market
timing. We ﬁnd similar results for the ratio of listing with large additional equity issuance to
existing listings. This measure exhibits a (signiﬁcant) positive response to predicted demand
shifts up to 5 years ahead, but a signiﬁcant negative response to predicted demand shifts 5 to
10 years ahead. As predicted, the results for equity issuance are stronger for industries that
are less competitive and for industries that have a lower time-to-build.
We also consider the impact of demand shifts on debt issues and repurchases. The evidence
regarding debt is imprecisely estimated. For most of the speciﬁcations, the sign of the coeﬃcient
estimates for demand shifts in the near future is consistent with capital budgeting but the
estimates are not statistically signiﬁcant. There is also little statistical evidence that demand
shifts in the distant future are related to debt policy.2
Finally, we provide evidence on the channels underlying these results. The model in Section
2 links equity and debt decisions to demand shifts due to demographics through investment.
We ﬁnd that positive demand shifts up to 5 years ahead increase investment. We also ﬁnd
that these demand shifts increase Research and Development (R&D). These results provide
evidence that investment, broadly deﬁned, is a determinant of the demand for external capital.
2However, in a few speciﬁcations long-term demand shifts are negatively related to debt repurchases.
This result could support market timing if debt is used as a substitute for equity, that is, undervalued
ﬁrms repurchase equity but do not repurchase debt due to ﬁnancing constraints.
3In Section 5 we discuss ﬁve alternative explanations: signalling, agency problems, large
ﬁxed costs of equity issuance, globalization, and the presence of unobserved time patterns
correlated with the demographic variables.
This paper is related to the literature on the empirical evidence of market timing.3 Relative
to this literature, we consider a novel exogenous proxy for mispricing. The paper is also related
to the literature on corporate response to anticipated demand shifts. Acemoglu and Linn (2005)
document that research and investment in classes of pharmaceuticals responds to anticipated
shifts in demand. Ellison and Ellison (2000) document that pharmaceutical ﬁrms respond to
anticipated patent expiration by altering their advertising decisions. Goolsbee and Syverson
(2008) document that airline companies cut their fare in response to the anticipated entry of a
competitor. Unlike these papers, we focus on equity and debt ﬁnancing decisions. This paper
also addresses the literature on the eﬀect of demographics on corporate outcomes (Acemoglu
and Linn, 2005; Mankiw and Weil, 1989) and on aggregate stock returns (Poterba, 2001).
Finally, we also extend the discussion of the role of attention allocation in economics and
ﬁnance.4 The evidence in this paper suggests that the inattention of investors with respect to
long-term information (DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007) aﬀects corporate ﬁnancing decisions.
2A M o d e l
We consider a simple two-period model of investment and equity issuance. The investment
opportunity is a long-term project. This long-term project may be ﬁnanced in either period 1
or period 2 and the cash ﬂow from this project is realized at the end of period 2. In the second
period the manager and the investors have the same (correct) expectations about the expected
value of the investment opportunity. However, in the ﬁrst period investors do not correctly
foresee the expected value of the investment opportunity in period 2, since the level of demand is
3Baker, Ruback, and Wurgler, forthcoming; Campello and Graham, 2006; Chirinko and Schaller,
2007; Gilchrist, Himmelberg, and Huberman, 2005; Hertzel and Yi, 2007; Jenter, Lewellen, and Warner,
2007; Polk and Sapienza, forthcoming.
4Barber and Odean, forthcoming; Cohen and Frazzini, forthcoming; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrah-
manyam, 1998; DellaVigna and Pollet, 2009; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh, 2004 and forthcoming; Hong
and Stein, 1999; Huberman and Regev, 2001; Peng and Xiong, 2006
4beyond their foresight horizon.5 Only the manager foresees the expected value of the investment
opportunity correctly since s/he has a longer foresight horizon. Therefore, limited attention
induces time-varying asymmetric information between the investors and the manager. We also
consider the rational expectations case where investors have correct expectations throughout.
To match the empirical evidence, it helps to think of the two periods as approximately
5 years apart. We assume that investors are naive about their limited foresight, and hence,
do not use the equity issuance policy to make inferences about the information known by the
manager. Also, since our goal is to focus on the impact of investor foresight, we do not consider
other forms of asymmetric information. We assume that the manager maximizes the price per
share for the existing shareholders that hold their shares until the end of period 2. We do not
incorporate other agency problems in the model.
We capture potential time-to-build aspects associated with the production process by con-
sidering two polar cases: (i) investment in period 1 or period 2 is equally productive (no
time-to-build), and (ii) investment in period 2 is completely unproductive (severe time-to-
build). The second case describes industries in which cost-eﬀective investment in new plants
must begin many years before production, that is, in period 1 not period 2. For example, it is
much less costly to build a new aircraft assembly plant over a multi-year period than building
it in one year.
We start by analyzing the investment decision. The ﬁrm chooses the level of investments,
I1,a n dI2 ∈ [0,∞), with a gross product αf (I1 + g (I2)) in period 2 where g(.) captures
the (potential) time-to-build considerations. The marginal productivity of investment in the
project is determined by α = {α,α}. When demand due to demographics is high, α is high:
α = α; when demand due to demographics is low, α is low: α = α < α. We assume that
the production function is increasing and concave: f0 (I) > 0 and f00 (I) < 0 for all I ≥ 0.
To guarantee positive and ﬁnite investment for each project, we assume standard limiting
conditions: limI→0 f0 (I)=∞ and limI→∞ f0 (I)=0 . For convenience, we consider two limiting
cases for g(I). In the absence of time-to-build aspects, we let g(I)=I so that there is no
5This mistake in expectations is an error in the perception of the average return for the project. It
is not related to any misperception of the risk properties associated with the project.
5reduction in the marginal productivity of investment even if the investment is implemented
in period 2. In the presence of time-to-build considerations, we let g(I)=0to eliminate
productive investment in the second period due to the prohibitive cost of delayed investment.
The manager uses internal funds or raises external ﬁnance (equity) in period 1 or 2 to
raise suﬃcient funds for the investments I1,a n dI2.I n o u r s i m p l i ﬁed set-up, equity is the
only ﬁnancial instrument that is aﬀected by the limited foresight horizon of the investor. We
discuss an extension with riskless debt at the end of this section. In period 1, the ﬁrm has
cash C available and N shares outstanding. We assume that the ﬁnancing constraints are only
binding when demand is high. The ﬁrm always has enough cash to undertake the ﬁrst-best
investment with low demand α, but not enough cash to undertake the ﬁrst-best investment
with high demand α without some equity issuance. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis
without altering the basic insights of the model.
The ﬁrm can issue n1 shares in period 1 (at price P1)a n dn2 shares in period 2 (at price P2).
The equity issuance in either period can be negative, that is, we allow the ﬁrm to repurchase
equity. We assume that there is a maximum amount of total equity issuance or repurchases:
0 <N≤ N + n1 + n2 ≤ N,w i t hN < N. We impose a similar constraint in period 1:
N ≤ N +n1 ≤ N. We select N to be large enough so that it is always possible to issue enough
equity to ﬁnance the ﬁrst best levels of investment, however it may not be optimal for the
manager to do so. These technical assumptions rule out inﬁnite share issuance and complete
share repurchase. Finally, we assume that the manager incurs an extremely small ﬁxed cost
K each time equity is issued or repurchased. This technical assumption simpliﬁes the analysis
in the cases in which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent with respect to equity issuance.
The manager maximizes the price per share of the ﬁrm for the long-term shareholders, that
is, total ﬁrm value scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the end of period 2. The
ﬁrm’s value is the sum of the initial cash holdings C, the equity raised in the two periods,
n1P1 +n2P2, plus the value of the investment, αf (I1 + g(I2)), net of the investment expense,





N + n1 + n2
(C + n1P1 + n2P2 + αf (I1 + g (I2)) − I1 − I2).( 1 )
s.t. I1 ≤ C + n1P1,
I1 + I2 ≤ C + n1P1 + n2P2,
N ≤ N + n1 + n2 ≤ N,
N ≤ N + n1 ≤ N.
While the manager knows the realization of the demand parameter α,i n v e s t o r si np e r i o d1
neglect demographic factors and make a forecast b α,w i t hα ≤ b α ≤ α. This assumption captures
the (potential) short-sightedness of the investors. In period 2, investors and managers agree
about the level of demand, since investors observe α directly.
We assume that the manager extracts all the surplus from outside investors. Hence, we
compute the highest prices P1 and P2 at which outside investors are willing to buy shares of





C + n1P1 + b αf
¡




− I1,e α − I2,e α
¢
,
where I1,e α and I2,e α are the levels of investment consistent with the (potentially incorrect)
demand forecast b α in period 2. In the absence of time-to-build aspects (g (I)=I), we assume
that the predicted levels of investment in the long-term project, I1,e α and I2,e α satisfy the
equation b αf0 ¡
I1,e α + I2,e α
¢
− 1=0 . In the presence of time-to-build considerations (g (I)=0 ),
we assume that the predicted levels of investment in the long-term project, I1,e α and I2,e α satisfy
the equations b αf0 ¡
I1,e α
¢
− 1=0and I2,e α =0 . These conditions deﬁne the ﬁrst-best levels of
investment for the project in each of the relevant cases if the true demand level is b α.
In period 2, investors are willing to purchase shares if
P2 =
1
N + n1 + n2
(C + n1P1 + n2P2 + αf (I1,α + g (I2,α)) − I1,α − I2,α),
where I1,α is the level of investment correctly observed by investors at the end of period 1 and
7I2,α is the forecast of investment in the second period that is consistent with the correct demand








− I1,e α − I2,e α
¢
to simplify notation and solve the two equations for the levels of P1 and P2: P1 = N−1 (C + Ve α)
and P2 =( N + n1)
−1 (C + n1P1 + Vα).
First, we analyze investment and equity issuance in period 2 (with no mispricing) and then
we consider equity issuance in period 1 (with mispricing).
Period 2. After substituting in the solution for P2 and rearranging, the problem of the












Vα + αf (I1,α + g(I2)) − I1,α − I2
¶
. (2)
The ﬁrst-order condition of this problem with respect to the level of investment in the second
period is equivalent to
αf0 (I1,α + g(I∗
2))g0 (I∗
2) − 1=0 .
Given our assumptions about f (.) and g(.), there is a unique solution for I∗
2.I fg(I)=I,t h e





− 1=0 . Alternatively, if
g(I)=0 , the solution is still the ﬁrst-best level of investment where I∗
2 =0(a corner solution).
In either case the solution for I∗
2 does not depend on the issuance decision n∗
2., To solve for
the optimal n∗
2 we substitute I2 = I∗
2 and I2,α = I∗






(C + n1P1 + αf (I1,α + g(I∗
2)) − I1,α − I∗
2),
which is independent of the equity issuance n2. Hence, optimal equity issuance in period 2 is
determined only by the need to raise suﬃcient funds to ﬁnance the optimal level of investment
in period 2. This result is not surprising because there is no divergence in expectations in the
last period and there are no other capital market distortions. Given the small ﬁxed cost of
share issuance (repurchase) K,t h eﬁrm does not raise equity in the second period (n∗
2 =0 )
if it already has enough funds to ﬁnance the investment, that is, if I∗
2 + I1,α − C − n1P1 < 0
or if I∗
2 =0 . Otherwise, the ﬁrm issues a suﬃcient number of new shares to ensure that
8n∗
2P2 ≥ I∗
2 + I1,α − C − n1P1.
Period 1. Using the solution for I∗
2, we solve for the optimal equity issuance (repurchase)






(C + Ve α)+
1
N + n1
(αf (I1 + g(I∗
2)) − I1 − I∗
2 − Ve α). (3)
The ﬁrst term in expression (3) is the value of the company according to the outside investors
(based on incorrect expectation that the demand shift will be b α). The second term captures
the value to the manager of exploiting the biased beliefs of investors by issuing or repurchasing
equity via n1. Note that the issuance (repurchase) decision in period 2 is irrelevant for the
maximization problem in period 1.We consider the standard case ﬁrst and then proceed to the
case with time-to-build aspects.
If g(I)=I (no time-to-build), the optimal level of investment in period 1 for the long-term
project satisﬁes αf0 (I∗
1 + I∗
2) − 1=0 . This ﬁrst-best level of investment, I∗
1 + I∗
2,i sa l w a y s
attained because the manager can raise suﬃcient equity in the second period to ﬁnance the
optimal investment. Hence, in the absence of time-to-build aspects, the expected value of the
investment opportunity is independent of the decision to issue or repurchase equity in the ﬁrst
period. Given the assumptions about f (.), the optimal investment policy, I∗
1 + I∗
2,i nt h e
project is an increasing function of α.
Next, we determine the optimal level of equity issuance/repurchase. Since the ﬁrst term





2 − Ve α (substituting I∗
1 for I1). If there is high future demand and
shortsighted investors, α = α>b α, this term is positive and the manager chooses to minimize
N+n1. Since the company is undervalued, the manager repurchases as many shares as possible
in period 1, n∗
1 = N − N, a n dt h e ni s s u e se q u i t yi nt h es e c o n dp e r i o dt oﬁnance the optimal
level of investment. If there is low future demand and shortsighted investors, α = α < b α,
the term is negative and the manager chooses to maximize N + n1. Because the company is
overvalued, the manager issues as much equity as possible, n∗
1 = N − N and there is no need
9to issue shares in the second period to ﬁnance the optimal level of investment. If g(I)=I,t h e
optimal level of investment in period 1 for the long-term project satisﬁes αf0 (I∗
1 + I∗
2)−1=0
and given the functional form of f (.), the optimal investment policy, I∗
1 +I∗
2, in the project is
an increasing function of α.
If g(I)=0(time-to-build), then I∗





(C + Ve α)+
1
N + n1
(αf (I1) − I1 − Ve α). (4)




− 1=0 .W h e nd e m a n d
is low (α = α), the term αf (I1) − I1 − Ve α is negative. The manager issues as much equity
as possible (n∗
1 = N − N) and selects the ﬁrst-best investment level IFB
1 . When demand is
high, (α = α), the manager would like to repurchase shares up to n∗
1 = N − N. However, this
action would make it impossible to undertake the ﬁrst-best investment IFB
1 because the ﬁrm
does not have suﬃcient cash on hand to ﬁnance the ﬁrst best level of investment when demand
is high. In this case, there is a trade-oﬀ between exploiting mispricing by repurchasing equity
and ﬁnancing the investment opportunity by issuing (or not repurchasing) equity in the ﬁrst
period. Hence, the motivation to repurchase shares due to market timing will generally be
attenuated by the need to ﬁnance investment in the presence of time-to-build aspects. This
trade-oﬀ implies that it is not obvious if investment is greater when demand is high than when
demand is low. However, the investment opportunity and any potential mispricing are both
quantitatively related to the magnitude of the demand shift and we are able to show that
investment is greater if demand is high (see appendix).
The next proposition summarizes these results. We use the notation ST to indicate the
standard case where g (I)=I and the notation TB to indicate time-to-build considerations
where g(I)=0 .
Proposition 1 (Inattentive investors). (i) In the case with high demand (α = α>b α)
and no time-to-build (g(I)=I), the manager repurchases shares in period 1 and issues shares
in period 2: n∗
1,ST = N−N<0 and n∗
2,ST > 0. (ii) In the case with high demand (α = α>b α)
and time-to-build (g(I)=0 ), the manager repurchases (weakly) fewer shares of the company




(iii) In either case with low demand (α = α < b α), the manager issues shares in period 1 and
does not issue in period 2: n∗
1,ST = n∗
1,TB = N − N>0 and n∗
2,ST = n∗
2,TB =0 .(iv) Total
investment (I∗
1 + I∗
2) is greater in the case with high demand (α = α) than in the case with
low demand (α = α).
Restating this discussion brings us to our empirical tests. Demand shifts in the near future
should be positively related to net equity issuance, but demand shifts in the more distant
future should be negatively related to net equity issuance. The second relationship should
be attenuated by time-to-build considerations. Finally, investment should increase with the
demand shift in the absence of time-to-build considerations
Attentive Investors. So far, we considered the case of short-sighted investors, for which
α < b α<α. We also consider the case in which investors are fully aware of the demand shift
α. The solution for the investment I∗
2 and equity issuance n∗
2 in period 2 do not change. The





(C + αf (I1 + g (I∗
2)) − I1 − I∗
2) (5)
In this case investors have correct expectations for demand in the ﬁrst period, and therefore,
investors also have correct expectations of investment. Hence, the ﬁrm has no incentive to issue
(or repurchase) equity in period 1, except to ﬁnance the investment. If g (I)=I, the manager
will raise equity in either period 1 or period 2 but not in both periods when demand is high.
If g(I)=0 , the manager will raise equity in period 1 when demand is high. If demand is low,
investment is ﬁnanced internally in either case. Because investment is ﬁrst-best, expression (4)
and the functional form of f (.) imply that the optimal level of investment, I∗
1 + I∗
2,m u s tb e
an increasing function of α. The predictions are summarized in the next Proposition.
Proposition 2 (Fully attentive investors). (i) In the case of high demand (α = α = b α),
t h e r ei sp o s i t i v ei s s u a n c ei no n eo ft h et w op e r i o d s(n∗
1 > 0 or n∗
2 > 0); in the presence of time-
to-build, there is issuance in the ﬁrst period only. (ii) In the case of low demand (α = α = b α),
there is no equity issuance (n∗
1 = n∗
2 =0 ). (iii) Total investment (I∗
1 + I∗
2)i sg r e a t e ri nt h e
11case with high demand (α = α) than the case with low demand (α = α).
For attentive investors, the only motive to issue equity is capital budgeting. Both equity
issuance and investment respond positively to the demand shift α. Equity issuance can increase
well in advance of the demand shift (period 1) or immediately before the demand shift (period
2) if time-to-build is not an important consideration.
Extensions. We brieﬂy discuss possible extensions and simplifying assumptions. It is
straightforward to generalize the model to allow issuance and/or repurchases of (correctly
priced) riskless debt in either period. Since riskless debt is issued for capital budgeting rather
than for market timing reasons, the main diﬀerential prediction would occur for high demand
due to demographics (α = α). Instead of raising equity to ﬁnance investment, the ﬁrm could
raise debt in either period. Hence, we test the additional prediction that debt responds posi-
tively to demand shifts due to demographics in Section 4.8.
We also assumed that the demand for equity is not downward sloping. Agency problems or
more sophisticated versions of asymmetric information would induce additional capital market
distortions and generate downward sloping demand curves. These factors would also distort
the investment decision and the discussion of the model would become substantially more
complicated. Optimal issuance and repurchase levels in the presence of mispricing would be
determined by the shape of the demand curve rather than the technical assumption of a
minimum and maximum number of shares. Nevertheless, we doubt that introducing these
modiﬁcations would change the key insights.
3D a t a
In this Section, we summarize the construction of the measures of demand growth due to
demographics.6 We also brieﬂy summarize the results about abnormal return predictability us-
ing demographic information to motivate our test of market timing. Next, we provide summary
statistics on the benchmark measures of equity issuance.
6See DellaVigna and Pollet (2007) for additional details regarding this procedure.
123.1 Demand Shifts Due to Demographics
To obtain demographic-based forecasts of demand growth by industry, we generate demo-
graphic forecasts and combine them with estimated age patterns in consumption by industry.
Demographic Forecasts. We combine data from the Census on cohort size, mortality,
and fertility rates to form forecasts of cohort sizes. We use demographic information available
in year t to forecast the age distribution by gender and one-year age groups for years u>t .
We assume that fertility rates for the years u>tequal the fertility rates for year t.W ea l s o
assume that future mortality rates equal mortality rates in year t except for a backward-looking
percentage adjustment. Using cohort size in year t and the forecasts of future mortality and
fertility rates, we form preliminary forecasts of cohort size for each year u>t ,which we the
adjust for net migration. We compute an adjustment for net immigration by regressing the
percentage diﬀerence between the actual cohort size and the preliminary forecasted cohort size
formed the year before, on a constant. We produce these adjustment coeﬃcients separately
for each 10-year age group using data from the most recent ﬁve-year period prior to year t.
We deﬁne ˆ Ag,u|t =
h
ˆ Ag,0,u|t, ˆ Ag,1,u|t, ˆ Ag,2,u|t,...
i
as the forecasted age distribution. ˆ Ag,j,u|t
is the number of people of gender g alive at u with age j forecasted using information available
at t. Ag,j,u is the actual cohort size of gender g alive at u with age j. These estimates, we
can forecast the actual population growth rate over the next 5 years, logAg,j,t+5 − logAg,j,t,
with an R2 of 0.83. The forecasts 5 to 10 years in the future are only slightly less precise.
Our forecasts also closely parallel publicly available demographic forecasts, in particular the
Census Bureau population forecasts created using data from the 2000 Census.7
Age Patterns in Consumption. We use data from the Survey of Consumer Expendi-
tures, 1972-1973 and the 1983-1984 cohorts of the ongoing Consumer Expenditure Survey to
estimate the age patterns in consumption. We cover all major expenditures on ﬁnal goods
included in the survey data. The selected level of aggregation attempts to distinguish goods
with diﬀerent age-consumption proﬁles. For example, within the category of alcoholic bever-
7We do not use the Census population forecasts because they are unavailable for many of the years
in the sample.
13ages, we separate beer and wine from hard liquor expenditures. Similarly, within insurance we
distinguish among health, property, and life insurance expenditures.
In Figure 1, we illustrate the age proﬁle for two goods using kernel regressions of household
annual consumption on the age of the head of household8. Figure 1 plots the normalized
expenditure on bicycles and drugs for the 1972-73 and 1983-84 surveys.9 Across the two
surveys, the consumption of bicycles peaks between the ages of 35 and 45. At these ages, the
heads of household are most likely to have children between the ages of 5 and 10. The demand
for drugs, instead, is increasing with age, particularly in the later survey. Older individuals
demand more pharmaceutical products.
This evidence on age patterns in consumption supports three general statements. First,
the amount of consumption for each good depends signiﬁcantly on the age of the head of
household. Patterns of consumption for most goods are not ﬂat with respect to age. Second,
these age patterns vary substantially across goods. Some goods are consumed mainly by
younger household heads (child care and toys), some by heads in middle age (life insurance
and cigars), others by older heads (cruises and nursing homes). Third, the age proﬁle of
consumption for a given good is quite stable across time. For example, the expenditure on
furniture peaks at ages 25-35, whether we consider the 1972-73 or the 1983-84 cohorts. Taken
as a whole, the evidence suggests that changes in age structure of the population have the
power to inﬂuence consumption demand in a substantial and consistent manner.
Demand Forecasts. We combine the estimated age proﬁles of consumption with the
demographic forecasts in order to forecast demand for diﬀerent goods. For example, consider
a forecast of toys consumption in 1985 made as of 1975. For each age group, we multiply the
forecasted cohort sizes for 1985 by the age-speciﬁc consumption of toys estimated on the most
recent consumption data as of 1975, that is, the 1972-73 survey. Next, we aggregate across all
the age groups to obtain the forecasted overall demand for toys for 1985.
In Table 1, we present summary statistics on the consumption forecasts. Columns 2 and
8We use an Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 5 years of age for each consumption good and
survey year.
9For each survey-good pair we divide age-speciﬁc consumption for good k by the average consumption
across all ages for good k.
144p r e s e n tt h eﬁve-year predicted growth rate due to demographics, ln ˆ Ck,t+5|t−1 − ln ˆ Ck,t|t−1,
respectively for years t = 1975 and t = 2000. The bottom two rows present the mean and
the standard deviation across goods of this measure. In each case, data from the most recent
consumer expenditure survey is used. In 1975, the demand for child care and toys is low due
to the small size of the ‘Baby Bust’ generation. The demand for most adult-age commodities
is predicted to grow at a high rate (1.5-2 percent a year) due to the entry of the ‘Baby Boom’
generation into prime consumption age. In 2000 the demand for child-related commodities is
relatively low. The aging of the ‘Baby Boom’ generation implies that the highest forecasted
demand growth is for goods consumed later in life, such as cigars, cosmetics, and life insurance.
Demographic Industries. We also categorizes goods by their sensitivity to demographic
shifts. For example, the demand for oil and utilities is unlikely to be aﬀected by shifts in the
relative cohort sizes, while the demand for bicycles and motorcycles depends substantially on
the relative size of the cohorts aged 15-20 and 20-30, respectively. We construct a measure of
Demographic Industries using information available at time t − 1 to identify the goods where
demographics shifts are likely to have the most impact. In each year t and industry k, we
compute the standard deviation of the one-year consumption forecasts up to 15 years ahead
given by
³
ln ˆ Ck,t+s+1|t−1 − ln ˆ Ck,t+s|t−1
´
for s =0 ,1,...,15. We deﬁne the set of Demographic
Industries10 in each year t as the 20 industries with the highest standard deviation of demand
growth. In these industries, the forecasted aging of the population induces diﬀerent demand
shifts at diﬀerent times in the future, enabling the estimation of investor horizon. Table 1 lists
all industries and indicates which industries belong to the subset of demographics industries in
1975 (Column 3) and 2000 (Column 5). Column 6 summarizes the percentage of years in which
an industry belongs to the Demographic Industries subsample. The Demographic Industries
are associated with high demand by children (child care, toys) and by young adults (housing).
Return Predictability. The evidence supporting return predictability is summarized in
10Ideally, we would like to select industries in which demographics better predicts contemporaneous
proﬁtability or revenue growth. Unfortunately, this avenue is not feasible for two reasons. First,
demographics is a small predictor of revenue and proﬁt, so one would need a long time series to identify
the industries with the highest predictive power. For univariate series with 20-30 observations, the
estimation would be poor. Second and relatedly, it would be impossible to do such test in the early
years of data without violating the requirement of only using backward-looking information.
15Figure 2. This ﬁgure plots the coeﬃcient of univariate regressions of abnormal annual industry
stock returns in year t on forecasted demand growth due to demographics in year t + h.T h e
panel regression includes up to 48 industries over the years 1974-2004. As Figure 2 shows, while
contemporaneous demand shifts (h equal to 1 or 2) do not signiﬁcantly forecast stock returns,
demand shifts 5-10 years ahead (h equal to 5-10) signiﬁcantly predicts returns.11 We interpret
this result as evidence that investors neglect forecastable determinants of fundamentals that
are more than 5 years in the future. The abnormal return for an industry increases when the
inattentive investors incorporate the upcoming demand shift 5 years in the future.12
3.2 Equity and Debt Issuance
IPOs. The ﬁrst measure of equity issuance captures the decision of ﬁr m si na ni n d u s t r y
to go public. We construct the benchmark measure of IPOs as the share of traded companies
in industry k and year t that are new equity listings in year t. The measure of new equity
listings is available for the full sample (1974-2004) for the large majority of the industries.
The average share of new listings ranges from 0.011 (Books: College Texts) to 0.126 (Cruises).
As an alternative measure, we also use the share of companies in industry k and year t that
undertake an IPO according to data from Jay Ritter. The main disadvantage of this alternative
measure is that the data is available only from 1980 until 2003. During the sample in which
both measures exist, the correlation between the two measures is .8228.
Net Equity Issuance. The measures of equity issuance for public companies in year t and
industry k are based on net equity issuance in year t scaled by industry book value of assets in
year t − 1 (Frank and Goyal, 2003). The measures are available for the entire sample period
for most industries, even though the number of companies included in the industry is smaller
than the corresponding number for the IPO measure, given the additional data requirement
that the company is in Compustat as well as CRSP. We deﬁne the measure of substantial
equity issuance as the fraction of companies in industry k that in a given year t that have net
11The the standard errors in Figure 2 are estimated using the methodology described in Section 4.
12More detailed evidence supporting abnormal return predictability is available in DellaVigna and
Pollet (2007).
16equity issuance greater than three percent of the book value of assets. This threshold, albeit
arbitrary, allows us to eliminate equity issues that are part of ordinary transactions, such as
executive compensation. The mean of this variable is .108, with a standard deviation of .190.
Similarly, we deﬁne a measure of substantial equity repurchases as the fraction of companies in
industry k that in a given year t that have net equity repurchases greater than three percent of
the book value of assets. The mean of this variable is .067, with a standard deviation of .164.
N e tD e b tI s s u a n c e .The measures of debt issuance for public companies in year t and
industry k are based on the net long-term debt issuance in year t scaled by industry book value
of assets in year t − 1.W ed e ﬁne measures of substantial debt issuance and substantial debt
repurchases following the same approach described for equity issuance.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Baseline Speciﬁcation
In the baseline speciﬁcation we regress the equity issuance variables on the forecasted growth
rate of demand due to demographics from t to t+5(the present and the near future) and t+5
to t +1 0(the further future). The speciﬁcation of the regression is
ek,t+1 = γ+δ0[ˆ ck,t+5|t−1−ˆ ck,t|t−1]/5+δ1[ˆ ck,t+10|t−1−ˆ ck,t+5|t−1]/5+βmem,t+1+βbmbk,t+1+εk,t
(6)
Since the consumption growth variables are scaled by 5, the coeﬃcients δ0 and δ1 represent
the average increase in issuance for one percentage point of additional annualized growth in
demographics at the two diﬀerent horizons. (The forecasts of consumption as of time t only
use information available in period t−1.) The speciﬁcation controls for market-wide patterns
in equity issuance, em,t+1, and the industry market-to-book ratio, mbk,t+1.13
In this panel setting it is unlikely that the errors from the regression are uncorrelated across
industries and over time because there are persistent shocks that aﬀect multiple industries at
13We also show in Table 4 that including lagged proﬁtability and lagged investment does not aﬀect
the results.
17the same time. We allow for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary contemporaneous correlation
across industries by calculating standard errors clustered by year. In addition, we correct
these standard errors to account for autocorrelation in the error structure.14
Let X be the matrix of regressors, θ the vector of parameters, and ε the vector of errors. The
panel has T periods and K industries. Under the appropriate regularity conditions,
q
1
T (ˆ θ −
θ) is asymptotically distributed N(0,(X0X)








k=1 Xkt−qεkt−q)]. The matrix Γ0 captures the contemporaneous
covariance, while the matrix Γq captures the covariance structure between observations that are
q periods apart. While we do not make any assumptions about contemporaneous covariation,
we assume that X0








k=1 ηkt)] = 0 for any q>0.
These assumptions imply Γq = ρqΓ0 and therefore, S =[ ( 1+ρ)/(1 − ρ)]Γ0.( D e r i v a t i o n
and details are in DellaVigna and Pollet, 2007) The higher the autocorrelation coeﬃcient







tXt where Xt is the matrix of regressors and ˆ εt is the vector of estimated residuals
for each cross-section. We estimate ρ from the pooled regression for each element of X0
ktˆ εkt on
the respective element of X0
kt−1ˆ εkt−1.
We use the set of Demographic Industries for the years 1974-2004 as the baseline sample
for the paper. As discussed above, the Demographic Industries are more likely to be aﬀected
by demographic demand shifts.
4.2 IPO Results
I nT a b l e2 ,w ee s t i m a t es p e c i ﬁcation (6) for the share of new equity listings, the benchmark
measure of IPOs. Columns 1 through 4 present the estimates for the sample of Demographic
Industries. In the speciﬁcation without industry or year ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 1), the impact
of demographics on new equity listings is identiﬁed by both between- and within-industry vari-
14This method is more conservative than clustering by either industry or year. In the empirical
speciﬁcations that follow, the standard errors computed with either of these methodologies are almost
uniformly lower than our standard errors.
18a t i o ni nd e m a n dg r o w t h .T h ec o e ﬃcient on short-term demographics, ˆ δ0 =3 .35, is marginally
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, while the coeﬃcient on long-term demographics, ˆ δ1 = −4.84,
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Introducing the controls for the industry market-to-book
ratio mbk,t and for the aggregate share of new listings em,t (Column 2) reduces the eﬀect of
long-term demographics to a marginally signiﬁcant ˆ δ1 = −2.49 and the eﬀect of short-term
demographics becomes insigniﬁcant. The control for the aggregate share of new listings is
highly signiﬁcant and close to 1, suggesting the importance of controlling for market waves in
IPOs. In this and the subsequent speciﬁcations in Table 2, the estimate of ρ is approximately
0.17, resulting in a proportional correction for the standard errors of
p
(1 + ˆ ρ)/(1 − ˆ ρ)=1 .19.
In Column 3 we introduce industry ﬁxed eﬀects. In this case, the identiﬁcation depends
only on within-industry variation in demand growth. The demand growth in the near-future
has a marginally signiﬁcant positive eﬀe c to nt h es h a r eo fn e wl i s t i n g s( ˆ δ0 =2 .45), while
the demand growth in the further future has a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect (ˆ δ1 = −3.07). We
obtain similar results in Column 4, where we introduce year ﬁxed eﬀects. In this speciﬁcation,
the identiﬁcation depends on within-industry variation in demand growth after controlling for
common time-series patterns.15
For the speciﬁcations in Columns 2-4, a one percent annualized increase in demand from
year 0 to 5 increases the share of net equity issues by about 2.5 percentage points from an aver-
age of 6.33 percentage points. (A one percentage point increase in demand growth corresponds
approximately to a 1.7 standard deviations.16) A one percentage point annualized increase in
demand from year 5 to 10 decreases the share of net equity issues by about 3 percentage points,
as i g n i ﬁcant and economically large eﬀect. While this eﬀect is large, we note that a decrease
of .5 percentage points is inside the conﬁdence interval for the coeﬃcient estimate.
In Columns 5 and 6 we use the alternative measure of IPOs based on the share of IPOs
a c c o r d i n gt od a t af r o mJ a yR i t t e r .S i m i l a rt ot h eresults obtained with the benchmark measure,
we ﬁnd that long-term demand growth due to demographics is negatively related to the share
15We ﬁnd quantitatively similar results using the Fama-MacBeth regression methodology. This alter-
native approach provides results that are largely consistent with the evidence from panel regressions.
16For this sample, the mean forecasted demand growth 0-5 (respectively, 5-10) years ahead is .0139
(.0118), with standard deviation .0059 (.0059).
19of IPOs. While the coeﬃcient estimate is positive for short-term demand growth due to
demographics, this eﬀect is not signiﬁcant.
Finally, in Columns 7 and 8 we present the results for the benchmark measure of IPOs, but
for the sample of non-demographic industries. The coeﬃcient estimates are similar but the
standard errors are about twice as large, despite the higher number of observations. For this
set of industries, the demographic shifts are not important enough determinants of demand. If
we group the two samples together and consider the sample of all industries (not shown), the
results are slightly stronger than those for the demographic sample.
To summarize, the impact of demand shifts on the share of new equity listings depends
on the horizon of the demand shifts. Demand shifts occurring in the near future increase the
share of IPOs, consistent with capital budgeting, although this eﬀect is not always signiﬁcant.
Demand shifts occurring further in the future, instead, signiﬁcantly decrease the share of IPOs,
consistent with market timing. In both cases, the eﬀect is economically large.
4.3 Net Equity Issuance Results
I nT a b l e3 ,w ee s t i m a t es p e c i ﬁcation (6) for the measures of net equity issuance by existing
ﬁrms in the sample of Demographic Industries.17
In Columns 1-3 we present the results for the measure of large equity issues, the share of
companies in an industry with net issuance above three percent of assets. In the speciﬁcation
without industry or year ﬁxed eﬀects (Column 1), the coeﬃcient on short-term demographics
is positive but insigniﬁcant (ˆ δ0 =4 .05), while the coeﬃcient on long-term demographics is
signiﬁcantly negative (ˆ δ1 = −7.24). Once we introduce the controls for the industry market-
to-book ratio mbk,t+1 and aggregate net equity issuance em,t+1 as well as industry ﬁxed eﬀects
(Column 2), the coeﬃcient estimates for both the short-term demographics and the long-term
demographics are statistically signiﬁcant. In this and the subsequent speciﬁcations in Table 6,
t h ee s t i m a t eo fρ varies between 0 and .30, for an average of 0.15, resulting in a proportional
correction for the standard errors of
p
(1 + ˆ ρ)/(1 − ˆ ρ)=1 .16. In Column 3 we introduce year
17The results are qualitatively similar but much imprecisely estimated for the sample of Non-
Demographic Industries.
20ﬁxed eﬀects, which lowers the coeﬃcient on short-term demographics considerably, rendering
it insigniﬁcant.
In Columns 4-6 we present the results for the large equity repurchases, the share of compa-
nies in an industry with net repurchases above 3 percent of assets. The qualitative results are,
as predicted, the opposite sign compared to the estimates for large equity issuance. However,
the estimates are less precisely estimated. Near-term demographic shifts are not signiﬁcantly
related to repurchases. Long-term demographic shifts increase the repurchases in Columns 4
and 5 but not in Column 6.
Finally, in Columns 7 and 8 we analyze the continuous measure of net equity issuance.
We ﬁnd evidence that near-term demographic shifts increase net equity issuance and long-
term demographic shifts decrease net equity issuance. In results not shown, we revisit the
speciﬁcations in Columns 7 and 8 using an alternative measure of net equity issuance in the
spirit of Baker and Wurgler (2002) deﬁned as the change in book equity minus the change in
retained earnings (scaled by lagged assets) and the results are qualitatively similar.
To summarize, the evidence matches the predictions of the model and is consistent with
the ﬁndings for new listings. Demand shifts occurring in the near future increase net equity
issuance, consistent with capital budgeting. Demand shifts occurring in the distant future sig-
niﬁcantly decrease the net equity issues by both decreasing issuance and increasing repurchases,
consistent with market timing. In both cases, the estimates are economically large.
4.4 Combined Issuance Results
Since the results for new equity listings and the results and large additional equity issuance
are consistent, we introduce a combined measure of equity issuance. This measure provides
additional power and reduces the number of speciﬁcations we consider in the subsequent analy-
sis.
The combined measure of equity issuance is deﬁned as the fraction of companies in an
industry that issued equity either through an IPO or through a secondary issuance. More
precisely, the dependent variable is the average of the benchmark measure of IPOs used in
Columns 1 through 4 of Table 2 and the measure of large equity issuance used in Columns 1
21through 3 of Table 3.
The results for combined measure of equity issuance match the ﬁndings for each of the
constituent measures (Columns 1 through 3 of Table 4).. The improved statistical power asso-
ciated with the combined measure leads to the more consistent rejection of the null hypothesis
for both short-term and long-term demographics signiﬁcant.
In Columns 4-6, we provide evidence regarding the appropriateness of the standard errors
employed in the paper. In particular, we replicate the regressions in the ﬁrst three columns using
the double-clustering procedure described by Thompson (2006). In general, the standard errors
based on Thompson (2006) are similar to those in Columns 1 through 3. In most regressions
the standard errors for the coeﬃcient on long-term demand growth are more conservative using
our approach than those using the double-clustering procedure.
In the last two columns of Table 4 we introduce additional controls for lagged accounting
return on equity and lagged investment even though these variables are themselves aﬀected
by the demographic shifts. Indeed, investment should be endogenously related to investment
opportunities (and perhaps mispricing). Proﬁtability is also related to demand shifts as docu-
mented in DellaVigna and Pollet (AER, 2007), and therefore, it may capture a portion of the
exogenous information embedded in demographics. Neither of these control variables have an
appreciable impact on the point estimates or standard errors of the coeﬃcients for short-term
or long-term demand growth.
4.5 Graphical Evidence
Using the same combined issuance measure, we present graphical evidence on how equity
issuance respond to demographic shifts at diﬀerent time horizons.
For diﬀerent time horizons h, we estimate the regression:
ek,t+1 = λ + δH[ˆ ck,t+h+1|t−1 − ˆ ck,t+h|t−1]+βmem,t+1 + βbmbk,t+1 + ηk + εk,t (7)
for the sample of Demographic Industries, for horizon h between 0 and 13 years. The coeﬃcient
δH measures the extent to which demand growth h years ahead forecasts stock returns in
22year t +1 .T h e s p e c i ﬁcation controls for market-wide patterns in issuance, as captured by
em,t+1, for industry market-to-book, as captured by mbk,t+1, and for industry ﬁxed eﬀects.
This speciﬁcation diﬀers from the main speciﬁcation in the paper in two ways: (i) we do
not require the short-term eﬀect to occur within 5 years and the long-term eﬀect to occur
5t o1 0y e a r sa h e a d ,b u te s t i m a t et h ee ﬀe c ta td i ﬀerent horizons; (ii) the speciﬁcation is a
univariate regression of equity issuance on demographic shifts h years ahead. Since demand
shifts at diﬀerent horizons h are positively related, the estimates capture the weighted impact
at diﬀerent horizons.
Figure 3 presents the results of the estimation of (7) Demand growth due to demographics
0 to 1 years ahead is associated with a small (not signiﬁc a n t )i n c r e a s ei nI P O sa c c o r d i n gt ot h e
benchmark measure. Demand growth due to demographics 2 or more years ahead, instead, has
a negative impact on IPO issuance. The impact is most negative (and statistically signiﬁcant)
for demand shifts 7 to 9 years ahead. Demographic shifts more than 10 years in the future
have a smaller (though still negative) impact on IPO decisions.
Overall, the pattern in this ﬁgure is remarkably consistent with the pattern for abnormal
returns in Figure 2: the horizons for which returns display signiﬁcant positive predictability
(4-8 years ahead) are approximately the same horizons for which we observe the signiﬁcant
negative impact on equity issuance, consistent with market timing.
This ﬁgure does not provide any statistical support for capital budgeting. However, this
lack of evidence should not be particularly surprising because demand growth at diﬀerent
horizons in the future are positively correlated with each other. If market timing is a stronger
motivation than capital budgeting (as suggested by the coeﬃcient magnitudes in Table 4),
the negative impact of market timing will swamp the capital budgeting eﬀect in a univariate
setting even for short term demand growth.
4.6 Time-To-Build
The model indicates that the impact of both long-term and short-term demographics is
attenuated by time-to-build. The investment required to expand production in response to
future demographic demand could take several years. In the empirical speciﬁcations above,
23the proxy for short-term investment opportunities includes a time-to-build of up to ﬁve years.
In some industries, however, the time required for investment could be longer. In these indus-
tries the lengthy time-to-build will attenuate the negative relationship between the long-term
demand due to demographics and security issuance. Essentially, long-term demand captures
not only the market timing (which induces a negative relation), but also the capital budgeting
(which induces a positive relation). In addition, in the presence of a substantial time-to-build,
short-term demand is unrelated to equity issuance because it is diﬃcult to build additional
capacity quickly enough to take advantage of a positive demand shift.
To provide evidence on the importance of time-to-build, we separate the sample based on
a proxy of time-to-build. We measure the amount of work in progress (Compustat data item
77) divided by the book value of the ﬁrm. Firms that have a higher share of work in progress
are more likely to have a lengthy production process and greater diﬃculty adjusting capacity
rapidly. We split observations in two groups, above and below the median value of .005.
In Columns 1 through 4 of Table 5 we present the results. Indeed, for the high time-to-
build industries (Columns 1-2), both coeﬃcient estimates are closer to zero and not statistically
signiﬁcant. For the low time-to-build industries (Columns 3-4), we ﬁnd coeﬃcient estimates
that are larger (in absolute value) than those for the benchmark sample, and long-term demand
is statistically signiﬁcant. Time-to-build appears to modify how ﬁrms respond to demand shifts
in a manner that is consistent with the predictions of the model.
4.7 Industry Concentration
The impact of a demand shift on equity issuance could depend on the market structure of
each industry. In a perfectly competitive industry there is no impact on abnormal proﬁtabil-
ity, and hence, no possibility of mispricing associated with long-term demand shifts. At the
other extreme, a monopolist with substantial market power generates abnormal proﬁts from a
positive demand shift, and therefore, demand in the distant future generates mispricing in the
presence of limited attention. Hence, evidence of market timing should be more substantial for
industries with high market power. Similarly, the evidence of capital budgeting may also be
more considerable for industries with high market power because the potential to earn abnor-
24mal proﬁts motivates the expansion of capacity. We address these issues issue by estimating
how the impact of demand shifts on equity issuance varies with the market power.
We use the concentration ratio C-4 from the Census of Manufacturers to measure market
power. This ratio is the fraction of revenue within an industry produced by the 4 largest
companies (including privately held ﬁrms). This measure is available for ﬁrms with 4-digit
SIC codes between 2000 and 3999. We deﬁne the measure for each industry as a weighted
average of the C-4 ratio for the SIC codes included in the deﬁnition of each industry. We
use the concentration ratios from 1972 (or 1970 if the 1972 data is missing) to guarantee that
the information about industrial organization is collected before the beginning of the sample
period. Among the 31 industries with concentration data the median C-4 ratio is 0.35.
We estimate the impact for industries with above-median and below-median concentration
ratios separately. The industries with above-median concentration (Columns 5 and 6) have
statistically signiﬁcant and economically large evidence of both market timing and capital
budgeting. For the industries with below-median concentration (Columns 7 and 8), the impact
of demographic shifts, while directionally consistent, is smaller and not statistically signiﬁcant.
4.8 Net Debt Issuance Results
I nT a b l e6 ,w ee s t i m a t es p e c i ﬁcation (6) for the measures of debt issuance in the sample of
Demographic Industries. We present the ﬁndings for large debt issuance (Columns 1 through
3); for large debt repurchases (Columns 4 through 6); and for the results using the continuous
measure of net issuance (Columns 7 and 8). The impact of macroeconomic conditions on debt
issuance, such as the yield spread and the credit spread, will be captured by the control for
market-wide activity or by the time ﬁxed eﬀects.
The sign of the coeﬃcient estimates for demand shifts in the near future is usually consistent
with capital budgeting but none of the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant. The statistical
evidence that demand shifts in the distant future are related to debt policy is more mixed.
Long term demographics are not statistically related to large debt issuance (Columns 1 through
3) or the continuous measure of net debt issuance (Columns 7 and 8). In Columns 4 through
6 debt repurchases are negatively related to demand shifts in the distant future. This result
25could support market timing if debt is used as a substitute for equity, that is, undervalued
ﬁrms repurchase equity but do not repurchase debt due to ﬁnancing constraints. Since market
timing does not have a clear prediction about the relationship between long-term demand shifts
and debt policy, this evidence is only suggestive.
4.9 Investment and R&D
In this Section, we provide evidence about the channels underlying the issuance results, and
in particular the capital budgeting response. The model in Section 2 links equity and debt
issuance to demand shifts due to demographics through investment. We document this link
using expenditures on investment and research and development (R&D).
The measure of investment for public companies in year t and industry k is the share of
companies with capital expenditures in year t ( s c a l e db yp r o p e r t y ,p l a n t ,a n de q u i p m e n ti n
year t − 1) greater than 0.8.18Columns 1-3 of Table 7 display the results of the estimation
of speciﬁcation (6) for the measure of investment. Demand shifts in the near future due to
demographics are associated with higher investment. The estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in the speciﬁcations in Columns 1 and 2 and marginally signiﬁcant in Column 3.
The eﬀect of these demand shifts is economically large. In the speciﬁcation of Column 2, a
one percent annualized increase in demand from year 0 to 5 increases the share of companies
conducting substantial investment by 3.2 percentage points (compared to the average share of
6.8 percentage points). A one standard deviation increase in the annualized demand growth
due to demographics 0 to 5 years ahead (0.59 percentage points), increases this measure of
investment by about 1.9 percentage points (more than 25% of the average industry share).
[Delete: (The mean share of companies investing is 6.8 percent)] There is no signiﬁcant eﬀect
instead of demand shifts 5 to 10 years ahead. If investment opportunities are the only moti-
vation for equity issuance, there is no reason for the issuance/repurchase decision to be linked
to demand shifts in the distant future.
Next, we consider as an alternative measure of broadly deﬁned investment, Research and
18The cutoﬀ for investment of 0.8 and the cutoﬀ for R&D of 0.1 correspond approximately to the
90th percentile of the respective distributions.
26Development (Columns 4-6). The measure of R&D is the share of companies with R&D
expenditures in year t (scaled by assets in year t − 1) larger than 0.1. While the evidence is
somewhat mixed, demand shifts in the near future are associated with higher R&D. There is
no evidence of a relation between R&D and demand shifts in the more distant future.
To summarize, we ﬁnd evidence that positive demand shifts up to 5 years ahead increase
both investment and R&D. Altogether, these results suggest that investment and R&D are
likely to be drivers of the capital budgeting response.
5 Alternative explanations
We analyze several alternatives that could potentially explain these results.
Signalling. Consider a variant of the dividend-signalling model of Miller and Rock (1985)
where equity issuance replaces the dividend as the signal and long-term demographic patterns
are characterized as (quasi-)private information observed only by managers. If managers are
unable to credibly signal to investors, then the ﬁrm’s equity is mispriced with respect to this
information. Investors are rational and understand that they are not fully informed. The
manager of an undervalued ﬁrm will attempt to convey this information to the public through
a costly signal, in this case a net decrease in equity issuance. The signal is costly because less
issuance leads to under-investment.
In principle, this signalling equilibrium could rationalize the observed response to long-
term demand shifts due to demographics. First, such a signalling equilibrium eliminates ﬁrm
misvaluation at the cost of an investment distortion. However, there is no evidence that ﬁrms
with high demand in the distant future invest less than ﬁrms with low demand in the distant
future (Table 7). Second, disseminating this information directly to investors is a less costly
strategy. The manager of the undervalued ﬁrm could disclose veriﬁable cohort size data and age
proﬁles of consumption to the investors. Third, it is not clear that the single-crossing condition
necessary for a separating equilibrium would be satisﬁed. The undervalued ﬁrm (which foregoes
the equity issuance) does not suﬀer less from the investment distortion. Indeed, these ﬁrms
have high demand due to demographics in the long-term and hence plausibly face a greater
27(marginal) cost of under-investment. Finally, the signalling model would not easily explain
the decision to remain private by an undervalued private ﬁrm because there is no beneﬁtf r o m
price correction for private ﬁrms.
Agency problems. F i r m st h a ti n t e n dt oe x p a n dc a p a c i t ym a yd e l a ye q u i t yi s s u a n c e
until the time when funds are needed to avoid the agency problems associated with excess
cash. This motivation to delay issuance could link investment opportunities in the distant
future to equity issuance. However, as the subsequent analysis indicates, agency problems do
not provide a plausible explanation for the ﬁndings. Consider two ﬁrms with identical short-
term investment opportunities and agency problems that make it extremely costly to raise
funds many years in advance of an investment opportunity. The ﬁrst ﬁrm also has a favorable
investment opportunity in the distant future while the second other ﬁrm does not. If the only
motivation for equity issuance is to ﬁnance expansion, then both ﬁrms raise the same amount
of equity in the ﬁrst period to ﬁnance the short-term investment opportunity, regardless of the
long-term opportunity. In the next period, the ﬁrm with the favorable long-term opportunity
in the previous period (transformed into a short-term opportunity by the passage of time)
issues more equity while the other ﬁrm does not issue equity. This example indicates that
equity issuance is related to short-term investment opportunities but unrelated to long-term
opportunities. Whether opportunities are favorable or unfavorable in the distant future, both
ﬁrms delay making a decision until just before the funds might be needed for investment in each
period Hence, agency problems alone do not generate a relation between long-term investment
opportunities and equity issuance.
Large ﬁxed costs of equity adjustments. A large ﬁxed cost of equity issuance has the
potential to generate an intertemporal linkage between issuance and investment opportunities
in the distant future. However, this linkage would be of the opposite sign compared to the
ﬁndings. We revisit the setting in which two ﬁrms have identical investment opportunities in
the near future and diﬀerent investment opportunities in the distant future. Assume that both
ﬁrms have favorable investment opportunities in the near future. If the ﬁxed cost of issuance is
suﬃciently large, then the ﬁrm with favorable investment opportunities in the near future and
the distant future, might prefer to raise suﬃcient funds for both projects all at once rather than
28issuing equity each period. Essentially, incurring the ﬁxed cost twice is worse than incurring
the ﬁxed cost once and enduring any agency problems generated by plentiful cash for the next
several years. In this case equity issuance is positively (not negatively) related to investment
opportunities in the distant future. If both ﬁrms have unfavorable investment opportunities
in the near future, then neither ﬁrm issues equity in the ﬁrst period and the ﬁrst ﬁrm issues
equity in the second period just in time to ﬁnance investment. Neither situation leads to the
negative relation between equity issuance and investment opportunities in the distant future.
Globalization. Demographic patterns in the United States do not fully capture demand
shifts induced by demographics because the goods and services produced by these industries
are not exclusively consumed by United States residents. To ﬁrst a approximation, this com-
plication creates an additional measurement error problem and biases the results against the
stated ﬁndings. Indeed, there are many factors that may predict demand shifts but are not
related to demographics at all. The severity of this problem is mitigated by two factors: 1) age-
speciﬁc growth rates in the United States are positively correlated with the analogous growth
rates for other OECD countries, and 2) the trade sector is still a relatively small fraction of
US GDP. In terms of explaining the ﬁndings, any aggregate patterns linking globalization to
equity issuance would be captured by the control for market-wide issuance in any case. It is
possible that industry-speciﬁc globalization patterns could be an omitted variable, but such
changes in demand would have to be strongly negatively related to demographic patterns in
the distant future.
Unobserved time patterns. The results could be driven by (unobserved) time patterns
that are correlated with demographic shifts. These time patterns may confound the estimation
to the extent that they are correlated with, for example, unobserved investment opportunities.
While we cannot reject this possibility, the ﬁndings in this paper still hold after controlling
for market-wide issuance patterns and, in most speciﬁcations, year ﬁxed eﬀects. An omitted
variable could explain the results only if it has a diﬀerential impact across industries over time.
296C o n c l u s i o n
Are equity and debt ﬁnancing decisions explained by capital budgeting, by market timing,
or by both? In this paper, we attempt to answer this question by using distinct and exogenous
proxies for investment opportunities and equity mispricing.
We construct predictable short-term and long-term demand shifts across industries gener-
ated by size changes in diﬀerent cohorts and by the age proﬁle of demand. We use short-term
shifts in demand due to demographics to examine capital budgeting. Positive short-term de-
mand shifts should increase the demand for capital and lead to more equity and debt issuance.
We use long-term shifts in demand due to demographics to analyze market timing. We as-
sume that the information about proﬁtability in the distant future predicted by demographics
is not fully incorporated into asset prices; hence, long-term demand shifts proxy for mispricing.
Corporate managers, to the extent that they have longer horizons than investors, should re-
spond to this mispricing by modifying their equity issuance decisions. Companies in industries
with positive demand shifts 5 to 10 years ahead will tend to be undervalued and managers
should reduce equity issuance (or repurchase equity). Conversely, companies in industries with
negative demand shifts 5 to 10 years ahead will tend to be overvalued, and managers should
issue additional equity.
Our empirical analysis suggests that both market timing and capital budgeting play sub-
stantial roles in the decision to issue new or seasoned equity. We ﬁnd that demand shifts due to
demographics in the short-term are positively related with the occurrence of IPOs in an indus-
try and with additional equity issuance by public ﬁrms. Demand shifts due to demographics in
the long-term are signiﬁcantly negatively related to the share of IPOs and to the net issuance
of ﬁrms. Finally, there is considerable evidence that investment and R&D expenditures are
related to short-term demand shifts as predicted by capital budgeting. While our estimates
do not allow us to establish whether one channel is more important than the other, we ﬁnd
evidence that both channels have economically large impacts.
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The rest of the proposition is proved in the text. In this case, I∗
2 =0 , so we only show
I∗
1,α >I ∗
1,α.I f α = α there are no ﬁnancing constraints, and hence, I∗
1,α = IFB
1,α .I f α = α,
the ﬁrst-best investment is not attainable without equity issuance and the manager wishes
to repurchase shares due to mispricing. Therefore, the ﬁnancing constraint will be binding.
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The ﬁrst order condition of this objective function with respect to I1 is equivalent to (scaled
by a constant)
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Notice that α disappears from the ﬁrst order condition. Hence, the optimal level of investment
will be independent of the level of α given a particular constant ˆ α. This property of optimal
investment arises because any increase in α simultaneously increases the marginal productivity
of investment (leading to share issuance) and the marginal motivation to exploit mispricing
(leading to share repurchases). These two forces perfectly oﬀset each other so that the net
issuance policy and the investment policy remain unchanged in response to an increase in α.
We show that for any level of I1 lower than IFB
1,α t h el e f th a n ds i d eo fe x p r e s s i o n( 8 )i sp o s i t i v e
for α = α. Therefore, the objective function must be a monotonically increasing function of
investment at least until the investment reaches IFB
1,α . The corollary of such a statement is that
investment must be greater for high demand than for low demand, I∗
1,α >I ∗
1,α = IFB
1,α .F i r s t ,
we note that for any level of I1 ≤ IFB
1,α there exists an αI1 ≤ α such that I1 is the ﬁrst-best
level of investment for that level of demand αI1,t h a ti s ,I1 = IFB
1,αI1. Next, since the expression
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This inequality demonstrates that the left hand side of the ﬁrst order condition is always
greater than zero for any I1 ≤ IFB
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Notes: Figure 1 displays a kernel regression of normalized household consumption for each good as a function of the age for the head of the 
household. The regression uses an Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 5 years. Each different line for a specific good uses an age-
consumption profile from a different consumption survey. Expenditures are normalized so that the average consumption for all ages is equal to 1 for 
each survey-good pair.    35




































































































Notes: The estimated coefficient for each horizon is from a univariate OLS regression of abnormal returns at t+1 on forecasted consumption growth 
between t+h and t+h+1 for the subsample of Demographic Industries during the period 1974-2004. The confidence intervals are constructed using 
standard errors clustered by year and then scaled by a function of the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality 
conditions.   36
    




































































































Notes: The estimated coefficient for each horizon is from a univariate OLS regression of the share of companies in an industry that issued equity 
either through a new listing in CRSP or through a seasoned issuance for year t+1 on forecasted consumption growth between t+h and t+h+1 for the 
subsample of Demographic Industries during the period 1974-2004. Each regression includes controls for market-wide patterns in new listings, 
industry-level book-to-market, and industry fixed effects.   37














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Child Care 30 0.0001 Yes 0.0024 Yes 100%
Children's Books 28 . . 0.0077 Yes 93%
Children's Clothing  30 0.0226 Yes 0.0138 Yes 100%
Toys 30 0.0044 Yes 0.0084 No 77%
Books -- college text books 30 0.0270 Yes 0.0156 Yes 100%
Books -- general 30 0.0205 Yes 0.0103 No 84%
Books -- K-12 school books 30 -0.0087 Yes 0.0092 Yes 100%
Movies  30 0.0232 Yes 0.0118 No 26%
Newspapers 30 0.0174 No 0.0140 No 0%
Magazines 30 0.0206 Yes 0.0122 No 29%
Cruises 28 . . 0.0143 No 28%
Dental Equipment 30 0.0138 No 0.0133 No 35%
Drugs 30 0.0167 No 0.0153 Yes 10%
Health Care (Services)** 30 0.0173 No 0.0135 No 0%
Health Insurance 30 0.0168 No 0.0142 Yes 16%
Medical Equipment** 30 0.0173 No 0.0135 No 0%
Funeral Homes and Cemet. 28 . No 0.0166 Yes 59%
Nursing Home Care 30 0.0198 Yes 0.0113 Yes 87%
Construction Equipment* 30 0.0200 Yes 0.0121 Yes 100%
Floors 30 0.0177 No 0.0140 Yes 81%
Furniture 30 0.0201 Yes 0.0105 No 58%
Home Appliances Big 30 0.0169 No 0.0117 No 0%
Home Appliances Small 30 0.0153 No 0.0132 No 0%
Housewares 30 0.0192 Yes 0.0138 Yes 58%
Linens 30 0.0170 No 0.0130 No 52%
Residential Construction* 30 0.0200 Yes 0.0121 Yes 100%
Residential Development* 30 0.0168 No 0.0130 No 13%
Residential Mortgage 30 0.0164 Yes 0.0070 No 77%
Beer (and Wine) 30 0.0209 No 0.0110 No 48%
Cigarettes 30 0.0178 No 0.0133 No 10%
Cigars and Other Tobacco 30 0.0141 No 0.0159 No 6%
Food 30 0.0145 No 0.0127 No 0%
Liquor 28 . No 0.0144 No 14%
Clothing (Adults) 30 0.0197 Yes 0.0130 Yes 29%
Cosmetics 30 0.0222 Yes 0.0149 No 6%
Golf 30 0.0217 Yes 0.0146 Yes 68%
Jewelry 30 0.0189 Yes 0.0134 Yes 68%
Sporting Equipment 30 0.0183 No 0.0096 No 42%
Life Insurance 30 0.0140 No 0.0150 Yes 48%
Property Insurance 30 0.0177 No 0.0133 No 10%
Airplanes 28 . . 0.0139 Yes 14%
Automobiles 30 0.0199 Yes 0.0112 No 26%
Bicycles 30 0.0027 Yes 0.0040 Yes 71%
Motorcycles 28 . . 0.0115 Yes 76%
Coal 30 0.0149 No 0.0135 No 0%
Oil 30 0.0161 No 0.0129 No 0%
Telephone 30 0.0185 No 0.0129 No 0%
Utilities 30 0.0149 No 0.0136 No 0%
Mean 0-5 Cons. Growth 0.0165 0.0123
Std. Dev. 0-5 Cons. Growth 0.0064 0.0028
1975 2000
Notes: Complete list of expenditure categories, with number of years of availability of data (Column 1) and average predicted five-year demand growth
rate due to demographic changes in 1975 (Column 2), and in 2000 (Column 4). The last two Rows present the Mean and Standard Deviation of the 5-year
predicted consumption growth across all the goods in the relevant year. Table 3 also indicates whether the industry belongs to the subsample of
Demographic Industries in 1975 (Column 3), and in 2000 (Column 5). Each year the subset Demographic Industries includes the 20 industries with the
highest standard deviation of forecasted annual consumption growth over the next 15 years. Column 6 presents percentage of the years 1974-2004 in
which the expenditure category belongs to the subsample of "Demographic Industries".     38
Dependent variable Share of Firms That Are New Equity Listings
Industry Sample Demographic Non-Demographic
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
3.349 2.237 2.446 2.785 1.994 2.831 1.687 -0.525
(1.847)* (1.474) (1.270)* (1.304)** (1.877) (2.273) (2.866) (4.502)
-4.843 -2.486 -3.071 -3.153 -4.793 -3.572 -4.955 -6.930
(1.453)*** (1.384)* (1.403)** (1.360)** (1.949)** (1.913)* (3.289) (4.270)
0.000 0.003 0.004 0.006 0.002 0.004 0.011
(0.0065) (0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009)
0.890 0.841 1.229 0.716
(0.143)*** (0.151)*** (0.1507)*** (0.072)***
Industry fixed effects XXXX XX
Year fixed effects XX X
Jay Ritter's IPO sample XX
R
2 0.040 0.133 0.245 0.306 0.260 0.315 0.264 0.297
N N = 580 N = 580 N = 580 N = 580 N = 451 N = 451 N = 848 N = 848
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 2. Predictability of New Equity Listings Using Demographics
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t and t+5
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t+5 and t+10
Notes: Columns 1 through 4 report the coefficients of OLS regressions of the share of firms in an industry that are new listings in CRSP for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth due
to demographics between t and t+5 and between t+5 and t+10 for the subset of Demographic Industries. Columns 5 and 6 report regression results for the subset of Demographic Industries where
the dependent variable is defined using new listings recorded in Jay Ritter's IPO sample (from 1980 until 2003). Columns 7 and 8 report the regression coefficients for the subset of Non-
Demographic Industries. The forecasts are made using information available as of year t-1. The coefficients on the forecasted annual demand growth are normalized by the number of years of the
forecast (5 for both coefficients). Each year the subset of Demographic Industries includes the 20 industries with the highest standard deviation of forecasted annual consumption growth over the
next 15 years. Standard errors are clustered by year and then scaled by a function of the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality conditions. A thorough description of the
standard errors is available in the text.
Industry market to book 
ratio
Aggregate share of new 
listings
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Dependent variable Large Net Equity Issues Large Net Equity Repurchases Net Equity Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
4.046 4.564 2.304 -4.209 -1.688 -0.939 -2.529 -1.782
(2.539) (1.955)** (1.637) (1.839)** (1.357) (1.619) (0.9970)** (0.821)**
-7.241 -5.267 -4.294 3.080 3.699 3.222 2.852 1.533
(2.588)*** (2.170)** (2.013)** (1.760)* (1.859)** (2.070) (1.034)*** (1.048)
0.016 0.037 0.056 0.046 -0.010 -0.012







Industry fixed effects XX XX XX
Year fixed effects XX X
R
2 0.030 0.284 0.349 0.013 0.169 0.213 0.230 0.286
N N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Aggregate share of large 
net equity repurchases
Table 3. Predictability of Net Equity Issuance and Net Equity Repurchases Using Demographics
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t and t+5
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t+5 and t+10
All specifications only include observations from the subset of Demographic Industries which are the 20 industries with the highest standard deviation of forecasted annual consumption growth over the next 15
years. Standard errors are clustered by year and then scaled by a function of the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality conditions. A thorough description of the standard errors is
available in the text.
Industry market to book 
ratio
Aggregate share of large 
net equity issues
Notes: Columns 1 through 3 report the coefficients of OLS regressions of the share of firms in an industry with stock issues minus stock repurchases divided by the lagged book value of assets that is greater
than 3% for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth due to demographics between t and t+5 and between t+5 and t+10. Columns 4 through 6 report regression coefficients of the share of firms in
an industry with stock repurchases minus stock issues divided by the lagged book value of assets that is greater than 3% for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth. Columns 7 and 8 report
regression coefficients of industry stock issues net of stock repurchases scaled by industry book value of assets (a continuous measure) for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth. The demand
forecasts are made using information available as of year t-1. The coefficients on the forecasted annual demand growth are normalized by the number of years of the forecast (5 for both coefficients).  
Aggregate net equity 
issuance
   40
Dependent variable Share of Firms That Are New Listings or Conducted a Large Net Equity Issuance
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )( 7 )( 8 )
3.717 3.509 2.564 3.717 3.509 2.564 3.194 2.436
(2.250)* (1.506)** (1.247)** (1.741)** (1.691)** (1.802) (1.363)** (1.168)**
-6.103 -3.907 -3.749 -6.103 -3.907 -3.749 -3.674 -3.519
(2.052)*** (1.571)** (1.517)** (1.863)*** (1.476)** (1.345)*** (1.477)** (1.412)**
0.009 0.021 0.009 0.021 0.006 0.014
(0.011) (0.012)* (0.011) (0.014)* (0.011) (0.012)






Industry fixed effects XX XXXX
Year fixed effects XX X
Double Clustering XXX
R
2 0.046 0.349 0.413 0.046 0.349 0.413 0.359 0.426
N N = 572 N = 572 N = 572 N = 572 N = 572 N = 572 N = 572 N = 572
Notes: Columns 1 through 8 report the coefficients of OLS regressions of the share of companies in an industry that issued equity either through a new listing in CRSP or through a seasoned issuance
for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth due to demographics between t and t+5 and between t+5 and t+10. The forecasts are made using information available as of year t-1. The
coefficients on the forecasted annual demand growth are normalized by the number of years of the forecast (5 for both coefficients). All specifications only include observations from the subset of
Demographic Industries which are the 20 industries with the highest standard deviation of forecasted annual consumption growth over the next 15 years. Standard errors are clustered by year and then
scaled by a function of the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality conditions. A thorough description of the standard errors is available in the text. In columns 4-6 we use an
alternative methodology to calculate standard errors based on the double-clustering approach recommended by Thompson (2006).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Industry market to 
book ratio
Table 4. Predictability of Combined Equity Issuance Using Demographics
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth 
between t and t+5
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth 
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Dependent variable Share of Firms That Are New Listings or Conducted a Large Net Equity Issuance
Sample High Time-To-Build Low Time-To-Build High Concentration Low Concentration
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1.101 1.617 5.225 2.078 5.478 6.746 1.057 0.866
(1.855) (1.725) (3.239) (3.477) (2.262)** (3.425)** (2.337) (1.980)
-1.600 -2.951 -6.640 -6.283 -7.358 -8.934 -1.551 -2.302
(2.413) (2.762) (2.874)** (2.469)*** (3.745)** (4.017)** (2.917) (2.790)
0.018 0.020 0.022 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.029 0.038
(0.008)** (0.012) (0.013)* (0.013)*** (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)*** (0.007)***
0.897 0.751 0.754 0.958
(0.102)*** (0.136)*** (0.115)*** (0.132)***
Industry fixed effects XX XX XX XX
Year fixed effects XX XX
R
2 0.428 0.471 0.313 0.357 0.279 0.317 0.420 0.499
N N = 661 N = 661 N = 746 N = 746 N = 447 N = 447 N = 451 N = 451
Aggregate net equity 
issues
Notes: Columns 1 through 8 report the coefficients of OLS regressions of the industry share of companies that issued equity either through a new listing in CRSP or through a large equity issuance for year
t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth due to demographics between t and t+5 and between t+5 and t+10. The forecasts are made using information available as of year t-1. The coefficients on the
forecasted annual demand growth are normalized by the number of years of the forecast (5 for both coefficients). The sample in Columns 1 through 4 is split using a measure of industry time-to-build (work in
progress divided by the book value of assets, industries where this share is higher than 0.005 are categorized as high time-to-build industries.) The sample in Columns 5 through 8 is split using a measure of
industry concentration (C-4 in 1972). The analysis of each split sample is not limited to the subset of Demographic Industries. Standard errors are clustered by year and then scaled by a function of the
autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality conditions. A thorough description of the standard errors is available in the text.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 5. The Impact of Industry Concentration and Time-To-Build on Combined Equity Issuance
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth 
between t and t+5
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth 
between t+5 and t+10
Industry market to 
book ratio
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Dependent variable Large Net Debt Issues Large Net Debt Repurchases Net Debt Issuance
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
3.515 3.665 2.510 -1.537 -1.281 1.601 1.408 0.569
(5.240) (4.397) (4.630) (2.425) (1.807) (1.576) (0.795)* (0.723)
0.712 2.060 2.004 -2.709 -4.026 -3.416 0.886 0.825
(4.388) (3.941) (4.213) (1.860) (1.464)*** (1.483)** (0.793) (0.785)
0.101 0.116 -0.028 -0.056 0.011 0.018







Industry fixed effects XX XX XX
Year fixed effects XX X
R
2 0.012 0.315 0.338 0.016 0.144 0.202 0.187 0.224
N N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575 N = 575
Aggregate share of large 
net debt issues
Aggregate share of large 
net debt repurchases
Table 6. Predictability of Net Debt Issuance and Net Debt Repurchases Using Demographic Changes
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t and t+5
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t+5 and t+10
Industry market to book 
ratio
Aggregate net debt 
issuance
Notes: Columns 1 through 3 report the coefficients of OLS regressions of the share of firms in an industry with debt issues minus debt repurchases divided by the lagged book value of assets that is greater
than 3% for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth due to demographics between t and t+5 and between t+5 and t+10. Columns 4 through 6 report regression coefficients of the share of firms in
an industry with debt repurchases minus debt issues divided by the lagged book value of assets that is greater than 3% for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth. Columns 7 and 8 report
regression coefficients of industry debt issues net of debt repurchases scaled by industry book value of assets (a continuous measure) for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth. The demand
forecasts are made using information available as of year t-1. The coefficients on the forecasted annual demand growth are normalized by the number of years of the forecast (5 for both coefficients).  
All specifications only include observations from the subset of Demographic Industries which are the 20 industries with the highest standard deviation of forecasted annual consumption growth over the next 15
years. Standard errors are clustered by year and then scaled by a function of the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality conditions. A thorough description of the standard errors is
available in the text.
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Dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2.746 2.990 2.113 0.833 3.849 3.728
(1.285)** (1.383)** (1.287)* (3.453) (1.891)** (2.147)*
-0.530 -0.174 0.727 0.381 -0.721 0.161
(1.325) (1.685) (1.709) (2.667) (1.348) (1.616)
0.008 0.004 0.012 0.025 -0.005 -0.004
(0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.031) (0.006) (0.007)
Aggregate investment 0.934 0.870
(0.305)*** (0.289)***
Aggregate R&D 0.089 0.310
(0.237) (0.136)**
Industry fixed effects XX XX
Year fixed effects XX
R
2 0.066 0.231 0.282 0.055 0.506 0.537
N N = 582 N = 582 N = 582 N = 582 N = 582 N = 582
Table 7. Predictability of Investment and R&D Using Demographic Changes
Share of Firms With Large Investment Share of Firms With Large R&D
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Notes: Columns 1 through 3 report the coefficients of OLS regressions of the industry share of companies undertaking significant investments (capital expenditures scaled by lagged
property, plant and equipment) for year t+1 on the forecasted annualized demand growth due to demographics between t and t+5 and between t+5 and t+10. Columns 4 through 6 report
similar regressions for the industry share of companies doing significant R&D spending (research and development scaled by lagged assets). The forecasts are made using information
available as of year t-1. The coefficients on the forecasted annual demand growth are normalized by the number of years of the forecast (5 for both coefficients). 
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between t 
and t+5
Forecasted annualized 
demand growth between 
t+5 and t+10
Industry market to book 
ratio
All specifications only include observations from the subset of Demographic Industries which are the 20 industries with the highest standard deviation of forecasted annual consumption
growth over the next 15 years. Standard errors are clustered by year and then scaled by a function of the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the sample orthogonality conditions. A
thorough description of the standard errors is available in the text.
 